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Fordham: Government by Judiciary

WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
mended, as aiding in the complete treatment of the point under
discussion. There is no index to the book, but due to the complete
treatment of the material therein contained in the Table of Contens the lack of one is not felt.
It is believed that this casebook will prove not only of value
to law students as a means of instruction to them, but also to the
attorney in general practice. An attorney using the book in his
practice will have to note the caution given by the author in the
preface, - that all the cases in the book are not the last authority
on the particular point for which cited. With the aid of a good
citator this difficulty is easily overcome, and the assistance upon
questions of criminal procedure to be derived from the use of the
cases in this volume will greatly outweigh that small drawback.
It is to be regretted that occasionally one has difficulty in
making out a line or two upon a reading of the cases and of the
notes, but this seems to be an inherent difficulty in turning out
a book by the method used in presenting this one to the public,
and in no place is the trouble so pronounced that it prevents one
from using the book to good advantage.
The collection of law in this casebook upon criminal procedure
in West Virginia is so complete and so excellent that the interested
public may well look forward to a similarly complete volume, by
the same author, upon the criminal law, - as distinguished from
the law of criminal procedure, - of the state.
-CHARLES

P.

WILHEL..

Harvard Law School.

GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY. By Louis B. Boudin. New York:
William Godwin, 1932. Two volumes. Pp. xvi, 583, 579.
The extent of the power exercised by American courts over
political and constitutional questions is appreciated by a scant
few of our citizens. One may venture to suggest that the average
lawyer has reflected little upon this important element in our
political life, which his profession has, partly as advocates and
partly as judges, brought to its present stage. Whether judicial
review of legislation and the position of dominance which it has
given the courts under our constitutional system is or is not desirable is a problem of solemn significance to the electorate, about
which it should be fully and correctly informed.
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Judicial review has been quite active of late in West Virginia.
Within the past eighteen months the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals has declared not less than nine acts unconstitutional.'
At the present writing the state is facing a crisis as a result of the
latest such decision.?
Mr. Boudin has come out boldly with the first comprehensive
attack upon what he terms the "judicial power". He devotes two
volumes to "proving" that we live under a constitution different
not only from what the Framers intended but also from what Marshall said it was.8 Despite this argumentative method' and an occasional inaccuracy' the work is something to be reckoned with by
the student of our constitutional system. It is a bit too
much for lay readers but one could expect little else in an
analytical legal study. Although the author demonstrates his
capacity for forceful, attractive expression, he has made the going
difficult by his method of "proving" his point by extended
quotations.' He develops his thesis by a more or less chronological
'study of United States Supreme Court cases. Early state
precedents are considered along with colonial and English
materials simply by way of brushing them aside as of no support
to Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. This phase of the argument
is elaborated in appendices to the first volume. Unquestionably
the early state decisions are not strong authorities and did not,
any more than Marbury v. Madison, establish the doctrine with
all its modern implications, but the chief justice was obviously
not bound by precedent in considering the existence of the power
under the Federal Constitution, a new situation.
Mr. Boudin
exerts himself most strenuously to make it clear that Marbury v.
Madison was in fact a complete Jeffersonian conquest over the
Supreme Court and that the chief justice deliberately resorted to
dictum to set out his theory of judicial review as a mere paper
' State ex rel.Baker v. County Court of Tyler County, 164 S. E. 515 (1932) ;
Bedford Corp. v. Price, 166 S. E. 380 (1932); Moates v. Cook, 167 $. E.
137 (1932); Danielley v. Princeton, 167 S. B. 620 (1933); Milkint v.
McNeeley, 169 S. E. 790 (1933); LaFollette v. Nelson, 170 S.E. 169 (1933);
Stand v. Sill and See, Buckeye Savings and Loan Association v. Smith, Tax
Amendment Cases (all not yet reported, 1933).
2Tax Amendment Cases (decided Sept. 19, 1933, rehearing denied Oct. 27,

1933).

sI, p. xi.

"Mr. Boudin has made a point in declaring in his introduction that there
is no such thing as disinterested scientific work but that does not explain his
failure, for example, to notice that constitutional decisions of which he approves are none the less exercises of the "judicial power".
5This has been sufficiently noticed by Wright, Book Review (1932) 45
HARV. L. REv. 1271.

aI, p. xiii.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol40/iss1/23

2

Fordham: Government by Judiciary
WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
threat to Jefferson and his party. Those familiar with the Warren
and Beveridge treatments of the subject will find this an interesting, if not, to them, an acceptable, contrast.
One steeped in orthodox interpretations of our judicial and
political history must certainly be disquieted by Mr. Boudin's
startling capacity for finding influences in our national life no one
else has noticed and his independent interpretations of events and
historical movements. The author's independence in this behalf
sometimes runs out of bounds, in fact. He tells us, for example,
that the well-known case of Sturges v. Crowninshield was what
brought on the "Jacksonian Revolution" of 1828 and purports
to sustain his point with an elaborate discussion of a remote phase
of Kentucky history!
Mr Boudin is not sufficiently critical of the authority of other
writers or judges as to matters of fact or points of law where
their conclusions fitted into his scheme of confounding the opposition.' The same is true in respect to his adoption of legal doctrines. Thus, though mercilessly analytical and realistic in his
treatment of Supreme Court decisions which he disapproves, in
criticizing Gelpeke v. Dubuque° he seizes eagerly upon the highly
artificial notion that when a court overrules itself it does not
change, and thus make, the law, but simply expounds what has
been the law all the time.'
In treating the period 1837-1857, which he calls the period of
confusion, Mr. Boudin finds the extension of the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States to inland waterways to be a beautiful
refutation of the notion that the meaning of the Constitution is
permanently and unalterably that which the framers put into
it. The sample is in point but Mr. Boudin's conclusion that
"practically, the meaning of the Constitution is that which the
majority of the Supreme Court for the time being choose to give
to it" is too broad. The author himself has made the significant
point that one of the worst criticisms of judicial review is the
fact that under stare decisis a ruling on a constitutional question
4 Wheat. 122 (1819).
8 See c. mii.
I The author calls John W. Davis the "official spokesman of the legal profession" in quoting Davis' presidential address before the American Bar
Association as if to say that Davis was speaking the view of the whole
American bar. See IT, p. 23.
11 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed. 519 (1864).

nlI, p. 350.
"I, p. 463.
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becomes in most cases irrevocably imbedded in the Constitution."
This means that Mr. Boudin would have been more correct had
he substituted the word "potentially" for "practically" in the
above-quoted statement. He ignores, moreover, the practical fact
that in the extension of federal admiralty jurisdiction the court
was simply accepting an extension that Congress had already made
and the still more significant point that it is only in the borderline
cases, apart from such exceptional matters as due process clauses,
that the court even passes upon constitutional questions.
The
notion that on occasion the court has given the Constitution a
different meaning than the Framers is, however, not to be denied.
The author makes this point again, of course, in discussing the
due process clauses.
The Dred Scott case, which is treated at great length, is
labeled the turning point in the development of the judicial power.
Mr. Boudin's position is that up to that time the only basis for
the judicial power was the notion that a legislative act which Congress had no power under the Constitution to enact was a nullity.
That case, he says, was the first in which the Supreme Court exercised the power of judicial review as we know it to-day. It is
true that Chief Justice Taney resorted to the due process clause
to declare invalid the Missouri Compromise but the author's conclusion that this set the style for subsequent cases is little more
than an ingenious guess because, as he says himself, the case being
in popular disfavor was little cited.
The second volume is devoted largely to a highlS critical dis
section of the better known constitutional decisions 'of the Cour
since the Dred Scott case. The author is at his best in his analyse.
of these cases. He has not failed to point out weaknesses, not for
the first time in most instances, however, both in the theory and
in the exercise of judicial review. This treatment is excellent as
far as it goes but is inadequate to the extent that it leaves the
reader without any enlightenment upon what ought to be done
about the situation. Doubtless the author would have us embrace
the Jacksonian notion that each department of the government
must settle constitutional questions for itself, leaving it to the
voters to provide checks upon abuse of power. But not even this
much is clearly articulated. Mr. Boudin, moreover, fails to give
any separate consideration to the problem of federal review of
"See esp. II, p. 512.
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state legislation, which involves the whole great problem of allocation of powers under our federal system.
Thus, while the work is an extremely valuable criticism of
the "judicial power", the difficult assignment of making out a
case for some positive adjustment in our system which will exclude
or modify judicial review remains to be done.
-JE

B. FORDHAm.

West Virginia University.

A

HISTORY OF WEST VmnuIA.

By Charles Henry Ambler.

New York, N. Y.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1933. Pp. 622.
A few decades ago, it was almost impossible for one to obtain
precise information as to the settlement and growth of West Virginia. In more recent times, a steady flow of literature has appeared, with the publication of "scores of historical monographs
and papers, together with numerous source materials," - which,
as the author explains in his preface, has made possible and desirable a new history of the state. Dr. Ambler has succeeded very
well in describing the main features of its progress, both in the
early past and of late years, without becoming involved in
intricacies of detail that might serve to confuse or district attention from the broad lines of West Virginia's development. If the
scholar seeks further enlightenment on any of the manifold
phases of the subject, the comprehensive and thorough working
bibliography will suffice for any ordinary research.
The characteristics of a book, most important to the reader in
this day and age, are interest and clarity. In both, the present
volume meets the requisite standard. It is intended to be service
able both to historian and to layman, - a perilous project for any
author. Yet there is the presentation of a well-balanced picture,
comprising in ample fashion the entire period from the aborigines
down to the legislative session of 1933. Institutional beginnings,
in "Tidewater" Virginia as well as in Allegheny Highland, are
clearly sketched. One finds an outline of political and economic
life, in all its social background, rather than simply a bare collection of events and personalities.
More specifically, customs and environment of the people are
described in vivid style, whether the period be pioneer or post-
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